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ARTICLE
SACRIFICE, THE COMMON GOOD, AND THE
CATHOLIC LAWYER
JOHN J. COUGHLIN, O.F.M.*
For some two decades since I entered law school, the connection be-
tween the philosophy of the human person and law has been of comparative
interest to me.' My interest was stimulated in no small part by the late Pope
John Paul II, who urged that canon law reflect the essential elements of
what it means to be human.2 Comparative legal study of the canon law of
the Catholic Church with the law of the liberal state has convinced me of
the importance of the understanding of the human person that underpins the
law. Canon law and the Catholic intellectual tradition of which it is a part
reflect a metaphysical conception of the human person and justice. In com-
* Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame. This paper is based on remarks at the
University of St. Thomas Law School Conference, "Sacrifice and the Common Good in the Cath-
olic Tradition," which was held April 7-9, 2005, in Minneapolis. The conference coincided with
the funeral of Pope John Paul II in Rome on April 8.
1. This interest started in law school during the mid-1980s, extended through my doctoral
studies in Rome in the early 1990s, and continues to the present time. See John J. Coughlin,
Common Sense in Formation for the Common Good, 66 St. John's L. Rev. 261, 295-303 (1992);
John J. Coughlin, Administrative Justice at the Supreme Tribunal of the Apostolic Signatura and
the United States Supreme Court: A Comparative Study 249-96 (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation,
Pontificia Universita Gregoriana 1994). Since becoming a law professor, I have had the opportu-
nity to speak about the subject at numerous academic conferences. These presentations have
sometimes resulted in published articles. See e.g. John J. Coughlin, Canon Law and the Human
Person, 19 J.L. & Religion 1 (2003-04); Coughlin, Pope John Paul II and the Dignity of the
Human Being, 27 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Policy 65 (2003); Coughlin, The Human Being, Catholic
Social Teaching and the Law, 1 J. of Catholic Soc. Thought 312 (2004); Coughlin, Law and
Theology: Reflections on What It Means to Be Human from a Franciscan Perspective, 74 St.
John's L. Rev. 609 (2000).
2. E.g. Ioannes Paulus Pp. II, "Allocutiones: I. Ad Rotae Romanae Auditores coram admis-
sos (Die 5 m. februarii a. 1987)," 79 AAS 1454-58 (1987) (English version available at http://
www.vatican.va/holy-father/ohn-paul-ii/speeches/1987/documents/hfjp-ii-spe-19870205_ro-
man-rotaen.html) (stating that canon law must flow from the essential elements of what it means
to be human); "Allocutiones: XII, Ad Romanae Rotae Auditores simul cum officialibus et advo-
catis coram admissos, annoforensi ineunte (Die 25 m. ianuarii a. 1988)," 80 AAS 1178, 1180-81
(1988) (English version available at http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/johnpaul-ii/speeches/
1988/documents/hf.jp-ii-spe_19880125_roman-rota en.html) (urging that canon law should re-
flect an "integrated concept of the person" in accord with theological anthropology, which strives
to enhance both natural and transcendent values).
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parison, law rooted in liberal theory tends to be more restricted to a political
conception of the person and justice.3 My focus in this brief paper is neither
on comparative law nor canon law per se. Rather, I have been asked to
reflect on the ideas of sacrifice and the common good in relation to legal
ethics. Specifically, I shall consider the contribution that the classical con-
ception of the person, which forms the bedrock of the Catholic intellectual
tradition, offers to the practice of law. The paper discusses the ideas of
sacrifice and the common good as essential elements of the understanding
of what it means to be human in the Catholic intellectual tradition. It then
suggests that the tradition has much to contribute to the practice of the
Catholic lawyer in the United States.
The paper consists of two parts. The first part considers the ideas of
sacrifice and the common good from philosophical and theological perspec-
tives. This is not intended as a systematic presentation about the ideas, but
as prolegomena. The second part considers three examples of how these
ideas from the Catholic tradition apply to the practice of law. Each of the
examples is posed as a question and again not as a comprehensive analysis.
I. PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SACRIFICE AND
THE COMMON GOOD
The understanding of what it means to be human in the Catholic intel-
lectual tradition, which is sometimes referred to as fundamental anthropol-
ogy, owes a debt to the thought of Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas.4 To
start, it seems helpful to recall two of Aristotle's claims about the nature of
the human person. First, Aristotle claimed that the human person tends to
become what he or she does.5 The second Aristotelian claim is that the
virtuous person finds happiness in the life of virtue.6 In other words, the
3. See Coughlin, Canon Law and the Human Person, supra n. 1, at 47-57.
4. See e.g. Henri de Lubac, Catholicism, Christ and the Common Destiny of Man 326 (L.
Sheppard & E. Englund trans., Ignatius Press 1988) (suggesting that the social character and
unitary nature of Catholic dogma do not diminish but enhance the human person); Bernard J. F.
Lonergan, Method In Theology 13-20 (Seabury Press 1979) (describing a "transcendental
method" as a basic pattern of human consciousness and knowing); Karol Wojtyla, The Acting
Person 196-97 (A. Potocki trans., D. Reidel Publg. 1979) (describing the integration of the human
person through intentional action); Karl Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith 24-115 (W. V.
Dych trans., Seabury Press 1978) (focusing on the experience of the human person as essential to
communicating revelation in the modem world); Hans Urs von Balthasar, A Theological Anthro-
pology 43-102 (Sheed & Ward 1967) (suggesting that the language of God is perfectly expressed
in the "human wholeness" of Christ).
5. See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, in The Complete Works of Aristotle bk. 10, ch. 9,
1179bl (J. Barnes ed., Princeton U. Press 1984) (observing that the human being is made good by
nature, habituation, or teaching, and that practice and habituation are necessary in any case);
Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, supra, at bk. 2, ch. 2, 1220bl;
Aristotle, Magna Moralia, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, supra, at bk. 1, ch. 11, 1187bl;
Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle's "Nicomachean Ethics" bk. 10, lec. 14, 2144, p. 640
(C.I. Litzinger trans., Dumb Ox Books 1964).
6. Aristotle, Magna Moralia, supra n. 5, at bk. 1, ch. 4, 1185al.
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more one acts in accord with virtue, the more virtuous one becomes, and the
more virtuous one becomes the more one discovers happiness.7 In this in-
tentional action lies the capacity for human fulfillment and excellence.8
From a philosophical perspective, St. Thomas Aquinas concurred with Aris-
totle's claims about human nature. Theologically, systematic reflection on
faith led Thomas to recognize the complementary claim that grace builds on
nature.9 These philosophical and theological claims about the human person
have a close relationship to the ideas of sacrifice and the common good.
In the Catholic intellectual tradition, the ideas of sacrifice and the com-
mon good are aspects of a conceptual framework with philosophical and
theological roots far too deep to trace here. Suffice it to say that since Vati-
can II, there has been a tendency in Catholic thought to rely more heavily
on the theological foundation than the philosophical. In an article about the
foundation of human rights, Walter Cardinal Kasper advanced solid reasons
for the theological preference."1 Essentially, the preference in the postcon-
ciliar Church stems from the recognition that in the Christian community,
convictions rooted in faith count as more compelling justifications than
those that are based on reason alone. At the same time, Kasper acknowl-
edged that theological faith and philosophical reason are complementary
and not exclusive categories. 1
A. A Philosophical Perspective on Sacrifice and the Common Good
Given the postconciliar preference for the theological, we ought not
lose sight of the philosophical understanding in the Catholic tradition. In
Catholic thought, the concept of the common good seems to be one funda-
mentally drawn from philosophy, and in particular, from natural law the-
ory. 2 The Vatican II document Gaudium et spes articulated a philosophical
definition of the common good. It is "the sum total of social conditions
which allow people, either as groups or as individuals, to reach their fulfill-
ment more fully and more easily." 3 The notion of the common good re-
mains a fundamental principle of the Catholic philosophy of the human
person. A corollary principle of this philosophy holds that sacrifice by indi-
viduals and groups is sometimes required to advance the common good.
7. Id. at bk. 1, ch. 3, 1177b1.
8. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, supra n. 5, at bk. 1, ch. 3, 1184b1; Aristotle, Magna
Moralia, supra n. 5, at bk. 1, ch. 18-19, 1109al.
9. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, pt. I-II, q. 109, art. I (available at http://
www.ccel.org/a/aquinas/summa/FS/FS 109.html#FSQ109OUTPI).
10. Walter Kasper, The Theological Foundation of Human Rights, 50 Jurist 148, 157-61
(1990).
11. See id. at 154 ("The biblical tradition soon allied itself with the ancient doctrine of natu-
ral law.").
12. See generally In Search of the Common Good (Dennis P. McCann & Patrick D. Miller
eds., T & T Clark 2005).
13. Vatican Council II, the Conciliar and Post Conciliar Documents 927 (Austin Flannery
ed., Costello Publg. 1992).
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Both principles are aspects of a philosophical understanding of the human
person from which the definition in Gaudium et spes is derived. I shall
briefly mention five features of this philosophical understanding.
First, this philosophy assumes a metaphysical approach by which the
human person is characterized by reason and free will. The Catholic philos-
ophy of the human person posits that individuals and groups cannot experi-
ence human fulfillment absent an understanding of the common good and a
willingness to sacrifice for it. This synthesis of understanding and action for
the good is known in natural law theory as "practical reason."' 4
Second, natural law recognizes the human person not simply as an
individual but as a fundamentally social being. Practical reason proposes
that individual sacrifice for the common good is an essential element of
human fulfillment. Self-sacrifice enables the human person to transcend self
and to participate in solidarity with others.' 5
Third, rather than diminish the human person, individual sacrifice in-
creases the human person by deepening his or her capacity to act in a
human manner. If Aristotle and Thomas are correct that one becomes what
one does, then the more one sacrifices for others the more one becomes a
human person. The philosophical paradox is that as one gives oneself away
for the other, one actually constitutes the self as more fully human.
16
Fourth, the philosophical understanding of the human person means
that the person enjoys not only individual rights but also concomitant re-
sponsibilities to contribute to the common good. Among contemporary nat-
ural law theorists the philosophical approach is evident in the works of,
among others, John Finnis and Martin Ronheimer.1
7
Finally, in a pluralist and secularized society, independence from di-
vine revelation counts as a desired feature of natural law theory in discus-
sion about the common good of society. The philosophical autonomy of
natural law theory enables it to introduce the ideas of sacrifice and the com-
mon good into public discourse without an appeal to faith or revelation.' 8
14. John Finnis, Aquinas 65 (Oxford U. Press 1998) (defining Aquinas's notion of "practical
reason").
15. See Wojtyla, supra n. 4, at 284-85 (discussing solidarity with others and the common
good).
16. See Karol Wojtyla, Love and Responsibility 125-26 (H. T. Willetts trans., Ignatius Press
1993) (describing self-transcendence that does not impoverish but enlarges the person and its
application to betrothed love).
17. See John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford U. Press 1980); Martin
Rhonheimer, Natural Law and Practical Reason (Gerald Malsbary trans., Fordham U. Press
2000).
18. See e.g. John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 765, 781
(1997) (asking whether it is even possible "for citizens of faith to be wholehearted members of a
democratic society who endorse society's intrinsic political ideals and values"); see also Patrick
Neal, Political Liberalism, Public Reason and the Citizen of Faith in Natural Law and Public
Reason 171, 177-78 (Robert P. George & Christopher Wolfe eds., Georgetown U. Press 2000)
(criticizing Rawls for not recognizing that persons with comprehensive religious worldviews may
2005]
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B. A Theological Perspective on Sacrifice and the Common Good
In contrast to the philosophical notion of the common good, the notion
of sacrifice in Catholic thought seems to me to be primarily theological.' 9
One may speak of the law of sacrifice as revealed in sacred scripture. 20 It
begins with the sacrifices offered in the Hebrew Bible in which one en-
counters the idea of propitiatory substitution in the shape of bloody or
bloodless offerings to atone for sin.2 One finds the substitution of animals,
scapegoats, and first fruits, even to the test of Abraham's willingness to
sacrifice his son Isaac. At the same time, the quid pro quo of sacrificial
substitution may be seen from the perspective of an ontic solidarity. Thus,
Noah stands for all his family, the prophet Jeremiah for the community, and
King David for his people. In Catholic theology, the sacrifices of the Old
Testament culminate in the sacrifice of the Son of God on behalf of all
humanity. The theological doctrine of original sin corresponds to the reality
of a fallen creation in need of redemption. The Gospels reveal Jesus Christ
as the one true sacrifice who offers himself as the redeemer. It seems obvi-
ous to me that the theological notion of the self-emptying of the Son of God
in the Redemption affords a richer and more compelling understanding of
sacrifice than the philosophical requirement of sacrifice as necessary to the
common good. For the Christian, Christ's sacrificial love serves as an ex-
ample to be followed.
Transformation through grace serves as a corrective to the fatalism that
may be detected in the ancient idea that one becomes what one does. In the
Catholic tradition, the mystery of the Redemption leaves open the possibil-
ity of transformation through Christ's love. The theology holds that all are
redeemed from sin by Christ, and therefore that salvation is open to all.22
Salvation is not a matter of achieving moral perfection through one's own
efforts. Rather, salvation flows from the purely gratuitous redemptive act of
Christ. According to the Catholic belief, personal conversion through grace
remains possible until the moment of death, and transformation of culture is
a lasting hope until the consummation of history. In the words of Saint Paul,
"[W]here sin abounds, grace abounds all the more."23 Indeed, in the econ-
omy of salvation, the reality of evil functions as the deficit yearning for the
dissent from the doctrines of political liberalism, not on selfish grounds, but because they believe
the liberal doctrine to be morally wrong); Paul Weithman, Citizenship and Public Reason in Natu-
ral Law and Public Reason 156-62 (Robert P. George & Christopher Wolfe eds., Georgetown U.
Press 2000) (rejecting John Rawls's position that citizens in the public forum ought not to make
appeals to religious comprehensive world views).
19. See generally The Redemption: An Interdisciplinary Symposium on Christ as Redeemer
(Stephen T. Davis, Daniel Kendall & Gerald O'Collins eds., Oxford U. Press 2004).
20. See William F. Hogan, Christ's Redemptive Sacrifice 13-16 (Gerald S. Sloyan ed., Pren-
tice-Hall 1963).
21. Leviticus 16:3, 16:5, 16:8, 16:9, 16:20, 16:26.
22. Aquinas, supra n. 5, at pt. III, q. 19, art. 4; Hogan, supra n. 20, at 73.
23. Romans 5:20.
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gain of Christ's grace.24 Thus, the Catholic tradition rejects the fatalism of a
determined history, and teaches that individuals and culture may be trans-
formed through redemptive grace.25
C. The Complementarity of the Philosophical and Theological
From the perspective of fundamental anthropology, the philosophical
and theological meaning of the ideas of sacrifice and the common good
have much to contribute to the understanding of what it means to be human.
I agree with Cardinal Kasper that the philosophical and theological under-
standings contain complementary and not exclusive meanings. As men-
tioned, Catholic philosophy has developed the notion of the common good,
but it could not do so without the corollary notion of individual and group
sacrifice. In other words, sacrifice for the common good is a requirement of
practical reason applicable to all human persons through the very nature of
what it means to be a human being. Theologically, self-sacrifice as exempli-
fied by Christ complements this requirement. The theological approach
tends to focus on the understanding that grace does not obliterate nature, but
builds upon it in order to perfect it. Catholic theology views human nature
as fundamentally good, but also disordered through selfishness. Theological
reflection on revelation leads the person of faith to understand Christ's self-
sacrifice as paradigmatic of the most complete human. For the believer who
accepts the revelation of Christ, self-sacrifice is not merely a requirement of
the practical reason written into human nature; at the same time, self-sacri-
fice joins one to the fullness of Christ's divinity and humanity. Baptism
initiates one into the life of Christ, and the sacramental life is believed to
offer the possibility for the divinization of the human person. In the Catho-
lic theological tradition, sacrifice for the common good is not just a require-
ment of practical reason; it is also essential to participation in the fully
human, fully divine life of Christ. The philosophical and theological under-
standings of sacrifice and the common good are mutually reenforcing. Both
reason and faith thus invite the human person to act in accord with the duty
of sacrifice for the common good.
II. SACRIFICE, THE COMMON GOOD, AND THE PRACTICE OF LAW
In applying the ideas of sacrifice and the common good to the practice
of law, I shall raise three questions: (A) Is law more of a profession or
business? (B) What function, if any, does moral value play in the practice of
law? (C) How do the ideas of sacrifice and the common good relate to the
requirement that one lead a balanced life? Prior to proceeding, I must ac-
knowledge that these questions quite obviously pose broad and deep issues
24. John Behr, Asceticism and Anthropology in Irenaeus and Clement 125 (Oxford U. Press
2000).
25. See Urs von Balthasar, supra n. 4, at 80-81.
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far beyond the modest parameters of this paper. To mention only one issue
as an example, Alasdair Maclntyre assists in elucidating the differing con-
ceptions of the human person that underpin various traditions of moral rea-
soning. He suggests that the classical Aristotelian-Thomistic position posits
the human person as having an essential nature and purpose.2 6 As already
noted, the classical understanding of the human person underpins the Cath-
olic intellectual tradition. Since the time of the Enlightenment, the classical
position has been challenged by other traditions of moral reasoning that
tend to take a less metaphysical and more functional view of the human
person. The Enlightenment critique notwithstanding, the ideas of sacrifice
and the common good in the Catholic intellectual tradition remain rooted in
the classical understanding of the human person. My purpose here is not to
defend the validity of the classical understanding, but simply to illustrate
how these ideas might apply to the service of the Catholic lawyer.
A. Law: Profession or Business?
My first illustration of sacrifice and the common good in the practice
of law poses the question: "Is law a profession or a business?"27 The tradi-
tional view was that the primary goal of the practice of law was service to
the common good, with financial gain as incidental to that service. The
attorney was also thought to be a fiduciary who placed the interest of the
client ahead of self-interest. According to Anthony Kronman, the traditional
view envisioned the ideal of the "lawyer-statesman" who was characterized
by "prudent wisdom," "public service," and "civic mindedness."28 The law-
yer-statesman ideal reflected a particular manifestation of the basic human
excellence described in an Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy. The ideal
also had theological origins: in medieval universities, there was a close as-
sociation between the vows professed by those entering the religious pro-
fessions and those entering the legal, medical, and teaching professions.
Today, the practice of law is increasingly viewed more as a business
than as a profession in the traditional sense. 29 Twenty-five years ago, the
profession/business tension could be detected in two United States Supreme
Court decisions that concerned the constitutionality of state regulation of
attorney solicitation. The first of these, Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Associa-
tion, involved a lawyer who had been indefinitely suspended from practice
26. Alasdair Maclntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory 57-59 (2d ed., Notre Dame
Press 1984).
27. See generally e.g. Mary Ann Glendon, A Nation Under Lawyers: How the Crisis in the
Legal Profession Is Transforming American Society 17-38 (Farrar, Straus & Giroux 1994).
28. Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession 14-52
(Harvard U. Press 1993).
29. Russell G. Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift: Why Discarding Professional
Ideology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1229, 1230
(1995) (suggesting that the paradigm shift from profession to business may prove helpful to the
Bar).
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for what the Supreme Court described as "ambulance chasing. 3° Ohralik
maintained that his professional activities were protected by the free speech
guarantee of the First Amendment. The lawyer's actions followed an auto-
mobile accident between a vehicle occupied by two teenage women and
another car driven by an uninsured motorist. These actions included arriv-
ing uninvited at the hospital bedside of the teenage woman who had been
driving the car, insisting that she enter into an attorney-client relationship,
visiting (again uninvited) her parents and examining the uninsured driver's
provision of their insurance policy, meeting with the young lady who was
the passenger and her parents to inform them of the uninsured motorist
provision, encouraging legal action in the face of client reticence, conceal-
ing a tape recorder during these various meetings so as to memorialize any
oral agreement about his legal services, persuading one of the women to
sign a written contract, informing the insurance company that he was the
attorney of record for both young women, and refusing to withdraw from
the case after both clients discharged him.3 The Court found Ohralik's ac-
tions to constitute commercial speech, which is not entitled to the full force
of constitutional protection afforded to political speech.32 The state was
thought to have a strong interest in regulating such speech.33 The sanction
against Ohralik was upheld.34
In the companion case, In re Primus, the lawyer, Edna Smith Primus,
was sanctioned for her activity aimed at stopping mandatory sterilizations
of poor women in South Carolina.35 The sterilizations were part of a state-
administered federal entitlement program. Working in conjunction with the
American Civil Liberties Union, Smith Primus sent a letter to certain wo-
men who were victims of the state-sponsored mandatory sterilization. Her
letter asked the women if they were willing to be part of a lawsuit aimed at
stopping the practice.36 In contrast to its decision in Ohralik, the Supreme
Court described the lawyer's activities as enjoying the full extent of the
First Amendment's speech and association protections. 37 The Court held
that the state's interests in enforcing the antisolicitation regulation were not
sufficiently compelling to pass constitutional muster.38 Smith Primus was
exonerated.39
Apart from the issues of constitutional law that are the basis of the
Court's decisions, I wish to draw attention to the profession/business dis-
30. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
31. Id. at 449-52.
32. Id. at 459.
33. Id. at 460-62.
34. Id. at 468.
35. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
36. Id. at 414-18.
37. Id. at 422, 431.
38. Id. at 437-38.
39. Id. at 439.
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tinction. While Ohralik aggressively pursued the attorney's share of a car
insurance policy, Smith Primus provided her services pro bono. In other
words, Ohralik was primarily involved in a business activity aimed at ad-
vancing his own pecuniary interest. Smith Primus, however, was acting as
a professional in her attempt to correct the grave state-sponsored injustice
of mandatory sterilization. n
An application of the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition suggests that
while Ohralik became anxious and began overreaching, Smith Primus con-
stituted herself as a professional willing to sacrifice her self-interest in order
to serve the common good. I do not mean to be unduly harsh on lawyers
who are so-called "ambulance chasers." There can of course be many exten-
uating circumstances in an individual's life that cause anxiety about finan-
cial interests such as support of children, spouses, and other family
members. To be good, the lawyer need not adopt the poverty of St. Francis
of Assisi. When the popular imagination begins to view the profession as
greedy, however, the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition may serve as a cor-
rective. Unfortunately, the noble image of the legal profession as comprised
of servants of the common good may not be as readily apparent today as the
tradition suggests it ought to be. On the natural level, the tradition requires
some sacrifice of self-interests to advance the common good. The law of
sacrifice rooted in Catholic theology deepens the foundation for such a
cause of action. It remains an aspect of the interior life of the Catholic
lawyer whose primary vocation flows from baptism.
B. Is there Any Place for Moral Values in the Practice of Law?
My second point about the ideas of sacrifice and the common good in
the professional life of the attorney concerns the issue of moral values in the
practice of law. Almost twenty years ago, Stephen Pepper and David Luban
entered into what is now a well-known debate over the issue.4' I ask your
indulgence as I review certain features of the debate in its original form.
40. I am aware of a growing body of literature expressing concern over a conflict of interest
issue posed by so-called "cause lawyering." Lawyers with strong political and ideological com-
mitments may sometimes put their commitments ahead of client wishes in the outcome of a law-
suit. Based on what is available in the record, I do not think that Smith Primus had such a conflict
of interest with her client. See generally Cause Lawyering: Political Commitments and Profes-
sional Responsibilities (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., Oxford U. Press 1998).
41. Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem, and Some
Possibilities, 1986 Am. B. Found. Res. J, 613 (1986); David Luban, The Lysistratian Prerogative:
A Response to Stephen Pepper, 1986 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 637 (1986). In relying on the debate
in its original format, I realize, of course, that Pepper later modified his original position. Stephen
L. Pepper, Lawyers' Ethics in the Gap Between Law and Justice, 40 S. Tex. L. Rev. 181, 184
(1999) (After summarizing his original 1986 argument that lawyers should be about the business
of providing unfettered access to the legal system, not making judgments about how it should be
used, he argues, on page 191, that "although the lawyer is not directly morally responsible for
assisting the client's wrongful or unjust conduct within the bounds of the law, the lawyer ought to
be responsible for ensuring that the client is morally responsible for that conduct, that the client
[Vol. 3:1
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I believe that the original debate exemplifies the limits that liberal the-
ory established for the inquiry, as well as the need for the fuller anthropo-
logical conception that is offered by the Catholic intellectual tradition.
Pepper argued that client autonomy and "first class citizenship" depend on
the lawyer's amoral stance.42 As long as a client does not seek to do any-
thing that is clearly illegal, the lawyer ought to act as a neutral facilitator of
the client's chosen objectives.43 Otherwise, the lawyer might impose his or
her own moral values on the client and thus threaten client autonomy. 44 In
response, Luban called for lawyers to act as moral filters in accord with the
interests of society as a whole.45 He argued that Pepper had confused the
value of client autonomy with the moral desirability of the client's autono-
mous actions.46 Luban pointed out that not all objectives of a client, even if
they fall within the parameters of legality, are necessarily morally desirable.
Instead of acting as amoral functionaries, Luban stressed that the lawyer
should enter into moral dialogue with the client if the client's actions con-
flict with the lawyer's understanding of moral value.4 7 When necessary due
has chosen it knowing the moral dimension of the choice." (citation omitted)). On page 193,
Pepper notes that "All the good reasons for providing 'amoral' access to the law-autonomy,
equality, effectuation of and availability of the law-thus suffer a discount to some extent as a
result of an obligation on lawyers to confront clients with the gap between law and justice." He
then concludes that lawyers and clients may be able to mutually disclaim responsibility for moral
choices; to counteract this problem lawyers should make it clear to the client that the moral choice
lies with the client. Luban also commented on aspects of the debate in subsequent articles. David
Luban, The Social Responsibilities of Lawyers: A Green Perspective, 63 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 955
(1995) (arguing that lawyers should balance the duty of zealous advocacy not only against the
interests of third parties but also against the interest of society as a whole on a macro level); David
Luban & Michael Millemann, Good Judgment: Ethics Teaching in Dark Times, 9 Geo. J. Leg.
Ethics 31 (1995) (arguing that the model rules presuppose good moral judgment and that this
judgment is best understood by understanding how it is learned).
42. Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role, supra n. 41, at 615-19; see also W. Bradley
Wendel, Teaching Ethics in an Atmosphere of Skepticism and Relativism, 36 U.S.F. L. Rev. 711,
731 (2002) (arguing that a lawyer's role is not "amoral" but rather "is justified by a complex
moral argument based on the structure and function of political institutions within a society and
the necessity of creating classes of experts who can work within those institutions to realize the
ends for which they are constituted").
43. See Elizabeth Reilly, Priest, Minister, or "Knowing Instrument": The Lawyer's Role in
Constructing Constitutional Meaning, 38 Tulsa L. Rev. 669, 709 (2003) (characterizing the Pep-
per article as presenting "the standard, or dominant, conception has the great advantage of being
easy to state and easy to adhere to as a practicing lawyer-one defers to the client and makes all
arguments plausibly legal in dogged pursuit of the client's perceived interests. Primary justifica-
tions rest upon serving client autonomy and the felt necessities (and strengths) of the adversary
system.").
44. Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role, supra n. 41, at 617; see also Norman W.
Spaulding, Reinterpreting Professional Identity, 74 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1, 79-82 (2003) (discussion
of the Pepper/Luban debate and agreeing on balance with Pepper that lawyers exercise too much
influence when they talk about morality with clients).
45. Luban, The Lysistratian Prerogative, supra n. 41, at 641-42.
46. Id. at 639.
47. Id. at 649; see also Robert F. Cochran, Jr. et al., Client Counseling and Moral Responsi-
bility, 30 Pepp. L. Rev. 591, 617-18 (2003) (arguing that the non-neutral lawyer does not impose
values on the client); Paul R. Tremblay, Moral Activism Manqu6, 44 S. Tex. L. Rev. 127, 132
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to a failure of the dialogue, Luban went further than Pepper in calling for
noncooperation on the part of the lawyer with the client's morally objec-
48tionable action.
Both Pepper and Luban were concerned about the impact of legal real-
ism on the practice of law.4 9 A legal realist sees the law as open to manipu-
lation rather than reflective of objective or formal principles. Holmes's bad
man asks not what the moral responsibilities of a given situation entail but
what the material outcome might be for the client. For example, the legal
realist lawyer would advise the client to breach a contractual agreement
without regard to any moral obligation to honor the contract if a more lucra-
tive opportunity arises and profit from the new arrangement with a third
party outweighs the financial consequences of breach. This might happen
when the other party to the original contract is in the right but would find
the costs of enforcing the contract too expensive. Pepper acknowledged that
the amoral role of a lawyer could pose some difficulty in a situation when
the client lacks moral direction. The amoral lawyer supplies the client with
information about the legal consequences of various possible actions and
then implements whatever decision the client reaches as long as it is law-
ful."o The deficiency of the client's ethics in conjunction with the amoral
function of the lawyer may well result in action that is lawful but unjust.5'
Luban agreed that realism presented a problem of morality and law. 2
Arguably, the realist perspective has a valid function in the practice of
law. As with the analysis offered by a law and economics approach, legal
(2002) (discussing Luban and Pepper extensively as background for the thesis that "because the
facts of any sophisticated legal dispute tend to be intricate and available only second (or third)
hand, lawyers cannot achieve the level of certainty necessary to carry their burden of proof when
the question of betrayal [by their client] arises.").
48. Luban, The Lysistratian Prerogative, supra n. 41, at 642 (thus the allusion to the classic
Greek story about the noncooperation of women of the city-states which forced the men to stop
the war). For Pepper's part, it must be acknowledged that he allowed for attorney "conscientious
objection" in so-called extreme cases.
49. Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role, supra n. 41, at 624-28; Luban, The Lysistra-
tian Prerogative, supra n. 41, at 646-48.
50. W. Bradley Wendel, Public Values and Professional Responsibility, 75 Notre Dame L.
Rev. 1, 52-55 (1999) (criticizing Pepper for reducing the lawyer to a mere technician in the
context of an argument that ethics ought to be thought of in a way that takes account of pluralistic
value systems).
51. David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism For Lawyers, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 468 (1990) (criticizing
Pepper and the traditional view for their conception that the "bounds of the law" provide a reason-
able ethical guide); Serena Stier, Legal Ethics: The Integrity Thesis, 52 Ohio St. L.J. 551 (1991)
(critiquing Pepper and a number of other proponents of different types of role morality for lawyers
and advocating a "boundaries principle" that would force the lawyer to be responsible for advice,
choice of client, and tactics but not for the client's ultimate goals).
52. Susan Daicoff, Asking Leopards to Change Their Spots: Should Lawyers Change? A
Critique of Solutions to Problems with Professionalism by Reference to Empirically-Derived At-
torney Personality Attributes, 11 Geo. J. Leg. Ethics 547, 562-65 (1998) (explaining that the
amoral role mixed with legal realism seems to produce a lawyer with no real moral constraints on
their actions, as part of a larger argument that most of the solutions to the decline in professional-
ism ultimately are reducible to changing engrained personality traits that most lawyers possess).
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realism affords a useful tool for predicting the outcomes of cases, assessing
legal liabilities, and fully informing the client of all the options and conse-
quences. When a lawyer's perspective is limited to realism alone, however,
there is little hope that the ideas of sacrifice and the common good will be
honored. Standing apart from moral value, legal realism widens the gap
between law and justice.53 It threatens to reduce the rule of law to a set of
arbitrary legal commands that have no basis in justice. Such a reduction is
not consistent with the common good. In light of the Aristotelian-Thomistic
claims about human nature, a lawyer who limits his or her legal analysis to
the realist approach detracts not only from the common good, but poses a
danger to self. If it is true that one becomes what one does, then such a
lawyer risks becoming Holmes's bad man.
The constitution of self through the practice of law raises the deeper
question of fundamental values. Neither Pepper nor Luban was entirely
clear about the basis for moral value.54 For his part, Pepper did not explain
why client autonomy is a first-order value that trumps all others.55 When
Luban called for the lawyer to enter into moral dialogue with the client, he
did not specify what he thought might constitute the source of the moral
values in the dialogue. Luban correctly observed that society reflects many
moral values, which are not necessarily encoded in law but are enforced
through informal means such as social disapproval and noncooperation.56 It
is illegal, Luban noted, not to declare a bottle of non-duty-free scotch, but
most persons, perhaps even most customs agents, are not terribly concerned
with a single instance of this technical illegality. Drawing on an example
53. William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1083, 1125
(1988) (criticizing Pepper's libertarian arguments, while advancing the idea that lawyers should
have ethical discretion based on a reflective professional analysis of the justice of a given claim).
54. Paul G. Haskell, Teaching Moral Analysis in Law School, 66 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1025,
1043-44 (1991) (explaining the amoral lawyer debate in the context of an argument that moral
analysis should be taught in law school since moral conclusions provide the basis for many laws);
Robert P. Lawry, The Central Moral Tradition of Lawyering, 19 Hofstra L. Rev. 311 (1990)
(arguing that a historical moral tradition of lawyering exists though it may not be able to be
captured in a code and engaging both Pepper and Luban extensively).
55. W. Bradley Wendel, Civil Obedience, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 363 (2004) (distinguishing
himself from Pepper on the basis that he thinks that "first-order" values should not be a part of
lawyers' ethical deliberation; rather, ethical decisions should be made on the basis of political
philosophy, whereas Pepper wants to justify the client-centered approach on the basis of the first-
order value of autonomy).
56. See David B. Wilkins, In Defense of Law and Morality: Why Lawyers Should Have a
Prima Facie Duty to Obey the Law, 38 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 269 (1996) (arguing that role
morality rather than personal morality should provide the basis for the few occasions where a
lawyer should be authorized to violate the law and engaging Luban extensively); Robert J. Muise,
Student Author, Professional Responsibility for Catholic Lawyers: The Judgment of Conscience,
71 Notre Dame L. Rev. 771, 795-98 (1996) (explaining why role morality is an understanding
that cannot be reconciled with Catholic teaching); Rob Atkinson, How the Butler Was Made to Do
It: The Perverted Professionalism of The Remains of the Day, 105 Yale L.J. 177 (1995) (citing
Pepper extensively and critiquing role morality, arguing for a dialogue-centered approach); W.
Bradley Wendel, Lawyers and Butlers: The Remains of Amoral Ethics, 9 Geo. J. Leg. Ethics 161
(1995) (citing Pepper extensively in an in depth treatment of role morality for lawyers).
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from the thought of Kierkegaard, Luban points out that most people would
condemn the seduction of someone based on false promises of love even
though such morally unacceptable conduct may be perfectly legal. Luban
thus acknowledged that there are important moral values apart from law,
but seemed to reduce the basis of such values to societal consensus. Neither
Pepper nor Luban suggested that there might exist an objective source of
moral value that underpins individual dignity and transcends culture and
history.57
When Aristotle claimed that a person becomes virtuous by acting in
accord with virtue, he obviously had such an objective measure in mind. He
thought that practical reason could detect fundamental values written into
the nature of what it means to be human.58 St. Thomas Aquinas also recog-
nized this natural law and agreed that acting in accord with it leads to
human fulfillment.59 The lawyer whose view of professional responsibility
is limited to a matter of client autonomy or to values based on societal
consensus cannot fully participate in human excellence as the Aristotelian-
Thomistic tradition understands it. Pepper's defense of client autonomy is
an inadequate account of the human good.6 ° It ignores other fundamental
goods such as truth, justice, respect for others, participation, and solidarity,
to mention but a few.6 Obviously, an excessive focus on individual auton-
omy threatens the common good.6"
Luban's appeal to values based on societal consensus also poses dan-
gers. From the perspective of natural law theory, the common good depends
on a complete and balanced account of fundamental goods. This includes
the requirements of distributive, commutative, and retributive justice. Dis-
tributive justice requires that goods be distributed equitably so that the
members of society, and especially those who are disadvantaged, have their
basic needs met. Commutative justice respects the individual dignity of
57. See Thomas D. Morgan & Robert W. Tuttle, Legal Representation in a Pluralist Society,
63 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 984, 986-91 (1995) (citing Pepper extensively in an explanation of the
amoral view, ultimately attempting to forge a middle ground between the amoral view and the
ethical counselor view).
58. See Aristotle, Rhetoric, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, supra n. 5, at bk. 1, ch. 13,
1373bl.
59. See Aquinas, supra n. 5, at pt. I-H, q. 90, art. 2.
60. See Cochran, supra n. 47 at 617-18 (arguing that the non-neutral lawyer does not impose
values on the client).
61. See Teresa Stanton Collett, Speak No Evil, Seek No Evil, Do No Evil: Client Selection
and Cooperation with Evil, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 1339, 1342-43 (explaining the amoral lawyer
view as grounded in a secularist understanding that comes from political liberalism, and going on
to analyze the question of client selection in terms of formal/material cooperation).
62. Paul R. Tremblay, Shared Norms, Bad Lawyers and the Virtues of Casuistry, 36 U.S.F.
L. Rev. 659, 693 (2002) (citing Pepper as a proponent of the hired gun approach in an article that
proposes that shared morality within the legal profession is possible); Michael I. Krauss, The
Lawyer as Limo: A Brief History of The Hired Gun, 8 U. Chi. L. Sch. Roundtable 325 (2001)
(explaining the hired gun mentality as uniquely modem and citing Pepper as one of its most
notable proponents).
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each person and calls for the protection of individual rights. Retributive
justice addresses the need for public order and security by punishing illegal
acts in proportion to their gravity.63 The lawyer who functions from the
perspective of natural law will recognize the requirements of distributive,
commutative, and retributive justice as aspects of a transhistorical and ob-
jective justice.
All of us who are attorneys find ourselves in the context of the increas-
ing secularization of the public sphere. Liberal theorists such as John Rawls
have gone so far as to argue that religious values ought to be excluded from
discussions about public policy and law.' In this context, it is not an easy
task to be faithful to the requirements of nature and grace as the Catholic
tradition understands them. It is a situation in which pride, avarice, injus-
tice, and fraud often triumph over humility, prudence, fairness, and honesty.
When confronted with approaches to law that deny natural and theological
virtues, we all have choices to make. Natural law theory and theological
reflection on the mystery of Christ afford the Catholic lawyer with an anti-
dote to approaches-such as legal realism-that separate law from justice.
In making choices, the Catholic tradition invites us to be humanized and
sanctified.
C. Should an Attorney Lead a Balanced Life?
My third and final point is relatively brief. It recalls the requirements
of nature and grace to lead a balanced life. In an insightful article about the
work of a lawyer, Patrick Schiltz states that "the single biggest complaint
among attorneys is increasingly long workdays with decreasing time for
personal and family life."65 The Catholic tradition suggests that the law-
yer's willingness to sacrifice for the common good ought to be guided by
the virtue of prudence. It is not prudent to neglect one's family and friends
on a regular basis. In addition to natural obligations that arise from family
and friendship, one also has the theological obligation to participate in the
life of the Church. Whether from the perspective of nature or grace, one's
participation in basic communities such as family and church yields a sense
of solidarity that remains an important component of human fulfillment.
Writing about the work of lawyers from a theological perspective, Cathleen
Kaveny decries "the dominance of the billable hour" as an affront to re-
63. See Aquinas, supra n. 5, at pt. I-n, q. 30, art. 3; see also Finnis, supra n. 17, at 187-215.
64. See John Rawls, Political Liberalism 147-49, 243 (Columbia U. Press 1996) (In defining
public reason as an "overlapping consensus," and arguing that political power may not be exer-
cised on the basis of religious values, Rawls stated, "What public reason asks is that citizens be
able to explain their vote to one another in terms of a reasonable balance of public political values,
it being understood by everyone that of course the plurality of reasonable comprehensive doctrines
held by citizens is thought by them to provide further and often transcendent backing for those
values.").
65. Patrick J. Schiltz, On Being a Happy, Healthy, and Ethical Member of an Unhappy,
Unhealthy, and Unethical Profession, 52 Vand. L. Rev. 871, 889-90 (1999).
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demptive time.66 A Catholic understanding of nature and grace suggests
that the lawyer may sometimes have to sacrifice opportunities for increased
wealth and prestige in order to participate in the basic associations of a
balanced life. Family and religion remain, after all, as essential constituents
of human fulfillment and the common good.
CONCLUSION
Prior to election as the successor to Peter, Karol Wojtyla published
The Acting Person.67 In this major philosophical work, the future pope elu-
cidated the Aristotelian-Thomistic claim that one becomes what one does.
The lawyer as person remains protagonist in the development of his or her
professional life. Natural law theory affords all attorneys with reason to
value the role of sacrifice in promoting the common good. For the Catholic
lawyer, the constitution of self is deepened through actions that reflect the
sacrificial love of Christ. With the death of John Paul II, I recall the first
time that I met him almost twenty years ago. The brief encounter proved
much more than a commoner's brush with celebrity. The beauty of his in-
ternal order stunned me. The graced moment left me with the desire to
become like him. I realized his soul had been shaped by decades of daily
sacrifices for the common good of humanity, the Church, specific commu-
nities, and individual souls. In the choices that we make as Catholic attor-
neys, let us attempt to follow in the example of this great man.
66. M. Cathleen Kaveny, Billable Hours in Ordinary Time: A Theological Critique of the
Instrumentalization of Time in Professional Life, 33 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 173, 180 (2001).
67. Karol Wojtyla, supra n. 4.
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